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F E A T U R E
Harris’s Scientists
Operational Research in Bomber Command 
R A N D A L L  WA K E L A M
Abstract : This essay describes the contents of a unique post-war 
report, available online thorough LCMSDS, by the Bomber Command 
Operational Research Section (ORS) in which the scientists described 
their mandate, work and contributions to the RAF’s strategic and tactical 
bombing efforts against Germany. While ORS reports are extensively 
cited in various histories of the bombing campaign, the processes by 
which the scientists did their work are not widely known; this essay 
provides insights into these matters. The essay also gives historical and 
historiographical context for both reading the report and appreciating the 
work of Harris’s scientists.
Deep in the laurir military history archive is a unique and amazing document that illuminates the Royal Air Force’s 
(RAF) bombing campaign against Germany. The Ronnie Shepard 
Fonds are best known for their material on British Army operational 
research, but if you access Series 1, the digitised section of the 
fonds online, you will discover within the Operational Research and 
Strategic Bombing pages a copy of “Operational Research in Bomber 
Command,” an extensive post-hostility summary of the origins, role 
and results of the Bomber Command operational research team.1 
The present article will, hopefully, give students of air power, the 
RAF and military ethics an overview of operational research (OR) in 
Bomber Command and context for the archival material. 
1  LCMSDS Laurier Military History Archive “Operational Research and Strategic 
Bombing,” accessed 15 February 2020, http://lmharchive.ca/operational-research-
and-strategic-bombing/.
© Canadian Military History 2020
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2 Harris’s Scientists
In 1961 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office published the official 
history of Bomber Command, The Strategic Air Offensive. 
Written by Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, the history is an 
impressive four volume set that describes in much detail the strategies, 
campaigns, tactics and technologies which, taken together, cover a 
span of approximately ten years.2 Two years later, in 1963, the office 
of the Air Historical Branch published a relatively unremarkable 
single volume entitled The Origin and Development of Operational 
Research in the RAF.3 The link between its 200 pages and the 
weighty tomes of the official history were and are not immediately 
obvious, but in the thirty pages that the OR history devoted to Bomber 
Command the reader got a flavour for the unparalleled challenges 
that commanders faced and the assistance that the scientists of the 
Bomber Command Operational Research Section (BC ORS) had 
provided in finding problems for technical and tactical conundrums. 
In essence, the Bomber Command chapter was the distillation of 
an impressive manuscript, titled simply “Operational Research in 
Bomber Command,” of some 620 foolscap pages which had been 
prepared by the members of BC ORS in 1945.4 It is that manuscript 
which is reproduced in its entirety in the Shepard Fonds and which 
gives the reader a deep and broad sense of how the scientists and 
flyers collaborated to bring both efficiency and effectiveness to RAF 
strategic bombing operations. 
This article looks at various aspects of the manuscript and 
consists of three sections. The first introduces the reader to OR and 
the context in which it was used in Bomber Command. The second 
section looks at the structure and content of the manuscript itself. 
A final section provides some recommendations for further reading 
as well as a view on the whole question of the RAF’s bombing of 
Germany.
2  Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against 
Germany 1939-1945, vols. 1 to 4 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961). 
The ten-year span includes the period before the war when bombing policy and 
capabilities were being developed. 
3  Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal 
Air Force (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1963). Hereafter referred to as 
Operational Research in the RAF.
4  Basil G. Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” n.d., Ronnie 
Shepard Fonds, Operational Research and Strategic Bombing, box 2, Laurier 
Military History Archives. Hereafter referred to as “OR in Bomber Command.”
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operational research
 In the broadest sense, OR has been described as “the use of scientific 
method in providing executive departments with a quantitative basis 
for decisions regarding the operations under their control.” In solving 
problems, scientists and executives do not work in isolation; rather, 
“[t]he good planner, the good executive with imagination, has to be 
fully informed about…capabilities and limitations…[And] The good 
operational research worker will inevitably find himself drawn (given 
a not too hostile environment) into the planning.”5
During the Second World War, “[p]ast operations were studied 
to determine facts, theories were elaborated to explain the facts, and 
finally the facts and theories were used to make predictions about 
future operations.” Frequently, the value of a quantitative assessment 
of particular circumstances was in the opportunity to confirm the 
commander’s intuitive conclusion with statistical analysis.6 Sir Robert 
Watson-Watt, the British pioneer of radar, saw a role for OR in 
confirming tactical efficiency. One needed, he said: 
to examine quantitatively whether the user organization is getting 
from the operation of its equipment the best attainable contribution 
to its overall objective, what are the predominant factors governing 
the results attained, what changes in equipment or method can be 
reasonably expected to improve these results at a minimal cost in effort 
and in time, and the degree to which variations in the tactical objectives 
are likely to contribute to a more economical and timely attainment of 
the overall strategic objective.7
Watson-Watt also formulated a short definition of OR stating simply 
that it sought “maximum effect from available resources.”8
5  Max Davies and Michel Verhulst, eds., Operational Research in Practice: Report of 
a NATO Conference (London: Pergamon, 1958), 2.
6  J.G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1947), 117.
7  As quoted in Solly Zuckerman, “The Need for Operational Research,” in Operational 
Research in Practice, eds. Davies and Verhulst, 8.
8  As quoted in Davies and Verhulst, Operational Research in Practice, 2.
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4 Harris’s Scientists
or across the raf
Operational Research in the RAF records that the RAF first used 
operational research during the development and fielding of radar 
for the air defence of Britain. While scientists such as Watson-Watt 
focused initially on the technology, the techniques of employing the 
system were also of fundamental importance and it was in this latter 
analysis that OR played a central role. So valuable were these and 
other contributions that, only weeks after the Battle of Britain, Air 
Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief 
(AOC-in-C) of Fighter Command, asked for the first permanent OR 
section (ORS) to be created in support of his command.9 
At Coastal Command, scientists initially attached to those 
headquarters to study airborne anti-shipping radar also investigated 
the command’s very low rate of U-boat sinkings. In what is considered 
among the “classics of operational research” (cited in many OR 
monographs), the boffins, as scientists generally were called in the 
RAF, were able to point out that both tactics and weapons were 
flawed. The resulting changes to depth charge settings and explosives 
resulted in an increase in sinking of near-surface subs from 2-3 per 
cent in 1941 to 40 per cent in 1944.10 
the bombers’ problem
Webster and Frankland wrote that the “operational requirements of 
a strategic bombing force are easy to express and difficult to attain.” 
First, a raid had to successfully penetrate enemy defences and 
navigate to the target area. Then it had to pinpoint and effectively 
bomb the objective and finally “return to base without suffering 
more than a bearable casualty rate.” As the two authors further 
explain: “The bearable casualty rate is a variable and a relative 
factor which is influenced by the rate of destruction that can be 
achieved. The greater the rate of destruction, the greater is the 
casualty rate that can be sustained on each operation, for the fewer 
9  Air Ministry, Operational Research in the RAF, 3-10.
10  Air Ministry, Operational Research in the RAF, 74-77.
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will be the number of operations which are required.”11 In other 
words, efficiency—Watson-Watt’s “maximum effect from available 
resources”—was linked to success.
Initially problems were not recognised. For example, Sir Arthur 
Harris, who commanded Bomber Command’s No. 5 Group early in 
the war and was later appointed AOC-in-C of Bomber Command 
in February 1942, said in his memoirs that there was no reason 
to suspect the well-trained pre-war crews were not getting to and 
bombing the target. Only with the introduction of bombing cameras 
in early 1941 did sufficient evidence finally begin to accumulate to 
identify “the enormous possibilities of error in navigation by night.”12 
Thus, in the summer of 1941 the head of the RAF, Sir Charles Portal, 
a former head of Bomber Command, welcomed an in-depth review 
of air photos undertaken by the staff of Churchill’s own scientific 
advisor, Lord Cherwell. The analysis concluded that on nights without 
clear weather or moonlight, roughly one-third of all aircraft claiming 
to have attacked their targets actually bombed within five miles of 
the aiming point; that is, somewhere in a 75 square mile area. When 
those aircraft that did not claim to have attacked were added to the 
count, the effective rate was estimated at one-sixth of the potential 
striking force of the raid.13 On 11 September, Portal recommended 
the establishment of an ORS at Bomber Command Headquarters.14 
officer in command ors and his mandate
Perhaps coincidentally, Harris’s predecessor, Sir Richard Peirse, had 
requested the creation of an OR section in August. In defining its 
mandate, he had said that “[b]roadly speaking, [research should 
cover] the general study of operations with a view to determining 
how the efficiency of operations in terms of bombs on target per 
aircraft lost could be increased.”15 
11  Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, Preparation: The Strategic Air 
Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1961), 17-19.
12  Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (Toronto: Stoddart, 
1947), 80-81.
13  Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 1, 178.
14  Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford (London: Heinemann, 1977), 303-04.
15  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 2-6. Emphasis added.
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Basil Gordon Dickins, author of Operational Research in Bomber Command, 
photographed by Walter Bird in 1959. Dickins was only 33 when he became head of the 
Operational Research of Bomber Command [© National Portrait Gallery, London]
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Dr. Basil Dickins, since the previous year tasked with producing 
monthly analyses known as “Report[s] on Losses and Interceptions 
of Bomber Command Aircraft,” was named section head.16 Dickins 
had received his PhD in 1929 from the Royal College of Science 
and soon after found employment at Royal Aircraft Establishment 
Farnborough.17 In 1936 he was recruited by Sir Henry Tizard, among 
the original RAF scientists, to work on the integration of radar 
into the air defence system (specifically the control of ground-based 
interceptors).18 By 1939, Dickins had been moved to the Maud Project 
on atomic weapons.19 Given the importance of these projects, one gets 
the sense that Dickins was seen by some of his seniors in the scientific 
world as an up-and-coming researcher. The official historians seem 
to confirm this, indicating that: “The appointment of Dr. Dickins as 
head of the…Operational Research Section of Bomber Command was 
an event of scarcely less importance than the widespread introduction 
of night photography.”20 In his memoirs, Dickins’s commander, Sir 
Arthur Harris, refers to Dickins only once, calling him both “brilliant” 
and “young.”21
bomber harris
‘Butcher’ Harris, so called because of his apparent indifference 
to casualties among his crews and German civilians, is often 
mythologised as the cold, distant bomber baron who would dully 
throw his crews, attrition style, against the German defences. Critics 
believe that Harris did not have a quick intellect. “A good case can 
be made,” historian Max Hastings explains, “that he was slow to 
grasp the possibilities and limitations of the new generation of radar 
technology” and that his staff were toadies. In Hastings’s view, “[t]
16  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 1.
17  Directory of British Scientists 1964-65 (London: Ernst Benn Ltd, 1964), xx. 
Dickins’s other post nominals included CBE, BSc, ARCS, DIC and FPhysS.
18  Ronald W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (London: Phoenix House, 1962), 50-54.
19  Clark, Rise of the Boffins, 87.
20  Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 1, 251. 
21  Harris, Bomber Offensive, 133.
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8 Harris’s Scientists
here appears to have been a chronic lack of open, critical debate… 
[with] too many weak men and sycophants around the throne.”22 
A different view was held by Charles Carrington, the army 
officer assigned to Bomber Command HQ during most of the war. 
Carrington had served in the Great War alongside Harris’s deputy, 
Robert Saundby, and was well connected in academic and publishing 
circles between the wars. Thus, he assessed Harris through the eyes 
of a contemporary:
‘Bert’ Harris…was the most dominating personality with whom I became 
acquainted in the Second World War. … No one doubted that he was a 
master of his trade and had been so since [the last war]…With his power 
of concentration on the aim, while excluding the irrelevant, he retained 
a rugged common-sense…As I came to know him better…I realized that 
22  Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979), 
245-47.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T Harris, Commander in Chief of Royal Air Force Bomber 
Command, at his desk in the summer of 1943. [© IWM TR 1093]
8
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he was not unco-operative, [and once committed to an idea] even if he 
opposed its inception, he gave his full support…23 
Henry Probert, Harris’s most recent biographer, says that Harris had 
“an intensively [sic] active and fertile mind eager to leave no stone 
unturned in the effort to prepare…for the concentrated operations 
that lay ahead.”24 We might well conclude that, while passionate, 
Harris would have been open to sound counsel, even that which 
might have run contrary to intuition or past practice.
“operational research in bomber command” – the 
manuscript
In his report, Dickins set out to tell several stories, each of them 
important in their own right for a reader  to understand the complex 
realities of Bomber Command, its headquarters, decision making 
within the command, the contribution of science and of the scientists, 
and certainly not least the terrible challenges and risks faced by the 
crews on every raid. Briefly, the manuscript contains chapters on: the 
creation, mandate, structure and integration of the section within 
the headquarters; the collection and analysis of data, including the 
evolution of techniques over the life of the ORS; the resolution of a 
range of problems dealing with navigation, target finding and attack; 
a similar range of problems dealing with the means of identifying 
the causes of losses and finding ways to reduce them; and finally, a 
chapter dealing with manpower efficiencies.
Reading through the online document on the Laurier Centre for 
Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) website, the 
reader will see that the manuscript was clearly a working draft. It 
is written in a variety of styles, contains ink amendments and lacks 
specific references for 5 to10 per cent of its footnotes; these are almost 
without exception references to specific studies and reports generated 
by the OR section.
23  Charles Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), 
85-86, 131.
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The document presents the accomplishments of the section 
in thematic order, dealing with various problems as they were 
investigated and resolved over the course of the ORS’s term. For the 
more scientifically minded reader, there is an excellent and lengthy 
chapter dealing with the processes of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis, as well as one dealing with the development of the data 
collection and processing techniques which permitted meaningful 
and relatively rapid quantitative analysis of operations. Although 
scientists and technicians associated with the section are identified 
in the annexes, there is no discussion of personalities or mention of 
which individuals would have worked on particular issues. Similarly, 
while there is considerable reference to the process of preparing 
and publishing reports, there are no samples or actual reports to 
give a better sense of typical form or format. From the perspective 
of understanding how the ORS headquarters worked, there are a 
number of statements concerning the integration of the section into 
Bomber Command headquarters. While we have only the scientists’ 
opinions, they concluded that after a period of adaptation they fit in 
well and were accepted as part of the team. The following paragraphs 
describe that integration as this working relationship was perhaps as 
vital as the science itself.
doing the science
In describing the remit of BC ORS, Dickins wrote that the scientists 
would from time to time receive high priority tasks from their seniors 
but “normally the items for research originated in the section itself. A 
detailed research program was prepared and occasionally submitted 
to the Commander-in-Chief and the Senior Air Staff Officer for 
approval and guidance as to priorities.”25
Initially there was some organisational trial and error, but by 
early 1942 the ORS had been arranged into three sections: “Research 
into success of Night Operations; Research into losses in Night 
Operations; Research into Day Operations.” An ORS 4 was created 
in mid-1942 with a broad mandate including the extremely important 
production of the Bomber Command Quarterly Review and the 
Bomber Command Raid Reports—publications which got important 
25  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 15.
10
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new information and findings out to squadrons and crews. Radar and 
manpower sections were soon added.26 The organisation grew from an 
initial complement of just seven researchers to fifty-five scientists and 
ten laboratory assistants by August 1943.27
Chapter Two of the manuscript describes the collection and 
analysis of data. The placement of this discussion early in the body of 
the history is significant, for arguably the legitimacy of the section’s 
conclusions and recommendations had everything to do with the 
soundness of its collection and interpretation of data. Amassing, 
sorting and analysing information on both successful and failed 
raids was a considerable task rendered more difficult by the fact that 
Bomber Command was involved in a major raid—the equivalent to a 
land or sea battle—several times a month. As Dickins explains, “[t]he 
problem is to reconstruct the raid, compare it with the plan, and (if 
possible) account for major discrepancies between them.”28 Initially, 
data was insufficient to offer valid conclusions, but by the beginning 
of 1943 Dickins was satisfied with the sample sizes being achieved 
and, by later in the year, with the analysis processes.29
There were two types of analyses. Qualitative analysis permitted 
the rapid estimation of tactical successes or failures and the results were 
published as soon as possible in ORS reports which were distributed 
within the headquarters and to the Groups involved. The product 
of quantitative analysis, on the other hand, was a set of numerical 
conclusions which were not all that well suited for publication. Yet 
it was the quantitative data which permitted comparison of different 
techniques and of the accuracy of attacks under different conditions, 
while also permitting estimates of “the weight of attack required in 
future operations.”30 
boffins and bombers
As mentioned, the scientists were not working in isolation, but 
rather in close contact with the RAF commanders and staff officers 
26  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 6-12.
27  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 2-6.
28  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 18-19.
29  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 29-30.
30  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 48-49.
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of the headquarters. It was Carrington’s general impression that: 
“the warriors, generals and marshals, were, in their hearts, a little 
afraid of these master-minds.”31 Yet aviators like Coastal Command’s 
AOC-in-C Sir John Slessor and Fighter Command’s AOC-in-C Sir 
Hugh Dowding were most appreciative of the contribution of their 
boffins.32 The latter, as he departed from Fighter Command, sent his 
scientists a note saying: “‘Thanks. This war will be won by science 
thoughtfully applied to operational needs.’”33 
In addition to continuous support from Harris, Dickins 
indicated a close working relationship between the scientists and 
the uniformed staff:
31  Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, 138-39.
32  Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 1956), 
486-87.
33  As quoted in Guy Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the Second World War (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 103.
Harris and photographic interpretation officers study aerial reconnaissance photographs of 
a recent raid in the Bombing Interpretation Room at Bomber Command Headquarters. [© 
IWM HU 93068]
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It is important to stress that the Section functioned as an integral part 
of the Command and worked in the closest collaboration with the other 
branches of the Headquarters. In fact, it is not too much to say that 
such success as was achieved by the Section was as much due to the 
receptiveness of the Service as to the efforts of the Scientists.34
Not only did the service staff consider “the incursion of the scientist 
into the field of operations…an innovation,” but Dickins also remarked 
that once the scientists had learned the ropes “no proposal made by 
the O.R.S. was ever turned down by the command on the grounds of 
impracticability.”35 This was a bit of a stretch as there were a number 
of conclusions and proposals which were not accepted. Generally, 
these were not for reasons of poor science; for example, conclusions 
about the nature of casualties as a result of flak were deemed too 
sensitive to pass down to the flying units for fear of their impact on 
morale.
the first year
One of the limitations of the “Operational Research in Bomber 
Command” manuscript is that the scientists fail to describe the 
complex nature of parsing useful conclusions from the tangle of factors 
at play during a raid. The text simply does not allow the reader to 
see how one set of raids could lead to a range of investigations and 
recommendations. Nor does the structure of the manuscript give the 
full sense of the complex interactions between the various tactical 
and technical problems facing the crews and the Command. The 
next few pages present a short summary of the ORS’s initial efforts 
which allows the reader to get some sense of these circumstances.36   
Within days of their arrival, the boffins were asked by the AOC-
in-C to sort out the causes of poor bombing accuracy, but they were 
reluctant to do so, stating insufficient and “scanty” evidence.37 By the 
34  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” preface.
35  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 13-14.
36  For readers that wish to look at the working of the ORS and the headquarters 
across the whole of the bomber war, see Randall Wakelam, The Science of Bombing: 
Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press), 2009.
37  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 50.
13
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end of September 1941, however, they were able to make a definite 
connection between the condition of the moon and a raid’s success. 
They were still clearly concerned about the reliability of the data, 
pointing out “the inherent unreliability of crews’ reports and the 
danger of basing any conclusions as to the success of the attack on 
these alone.”38 In December, the section concluded a large trial which 
attempted to gain a better understanding of what crews actually 
thought they were seeing at night. The scientists gauged from this 
that there was a “big difference in the reliability of various ground 
features.” Lakes and rivers, although very popular, had proved to 
be particularly unreliable, while coastal features including docks 
were relatively “trustworthy.”39 The boffins’ report was circulated 
to all command organisations and emphasised the requirement to 
focus on map-reading skills, both in theory and in practice.40 They 
were evidently not shy to offer criticism but, as importantly, the 
38  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 51.
39  BC ORS Report No. 31, 14 February 1942, Air 14/516, The National Archives 
(TNA).
40  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 52-53.
Tiredness etched on the face of a young Halifax pilot of No 405 (Vancouver) Squadron, 
RCAF, after returning from an operation over Germany, July/August 1942. [© IWM CH 6627]
14
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headquarters staff did not shy away from getting scientific views out 
to the flying stations.
Navigating to the target area and finding the target could both 
be addressed to some extent, it was generally accepted, by the 
operational use of the navigation device T.R. 1335, or Gee as it 
had been dubbed. After the boffins had recommended that research 
be conducted to find the best means of using Gee, the AOC-in-C 
“entrusted” the scientists “with the task of drawing up detailed plans 
for such experiments.” A plan was developed and two experimental 
attacks, codenamed Cracker, were conducted on 13 and 20 February 
over the Isle of Man to confirm the soundness of the nascent “Shaker” 
attack protocol.41 A Shaker attack consisted of three waves: Gee-
equipped “Illuminators” to drop flares, incendiary dropping “Target 
markers,” and finally the “Followers” to bomb with high explosives. 
Just days after Harris took command, the procedure was tested 
during the very successful attack on Renault factory at Billancourt 
near Paris on 3 March 1942.42 What is fascinating to note is that it 
had been the scientists, not the flyers on staff, who were given the 
task of sorting out the operational use of Gee.
Concentration and the ability to use Gee to actually get the raid 
to the target had been keys elements in Harris’ big raid on Cologne—
the first “1000 raid” on the night of 30 May. Prior to target selection 
the ORS had done a detailed review of the previous year’s raids and 
Dickins was called in to brief Harris on their findings. Ralph Barker, 
author of The Thousand Plan, describes how the scientist went toe-
to-toe with his commander. Dickins was firm that the attack should 
take place within Gee range and repeatedly recommended Cologne, 
despite Harris’s desire to attack Hamburg which, as a port, Dickins 
agreed would be easy to find. “At the end Harris said[,] ‘I still want 
to take on Hamburg.’ ‘Stay within Gee coverage,’ advised Dickins. 
‘Go to Cologne.’”43 The operation order for the raid continued to show 
Hamburg as the primary target, with Cologne as the alternate,44 but 
according to Barker, Harris had actually heard and accepted Dickins 
41  Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 53-54.
42  Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 1, 385-88.
43  Ralph Barker, The Thousand Plan: The Story of the First Thousand Bomber Raid 
on Cologne (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), 44-48.
44  “BC Op Order No 148, dated 26 May 1942,” Air 14/276, TNA. Of note, the attack 
on Hamburg was planned for 60 minutes (16.7 aircraft per minute for 1000 raiders) 
while Cologne was scheduled for 90 minutes (11 aircraft per minute).
15
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ORS Plot of Bomb Release Photos for an attack on Berlin in late November 1943. The 
bombing has been scattered and largely missed the aiming point—the centre of Berlin with 
its widespread industries and military headquarters. Analysis of every attack was essential 
in allowing the operational decision makers to adjust tactics and procedures in order to 
maximize the effect of raids. Detail from ORS B 186 Interim Raid Report on Berlin – 26/27th 
November, 1943 (H2S Groundmarking), 31 December 1943. [TNA AIR 14/2686]
16
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counsel: “He had come to rely on Dickins’s flair for finding out before 
a raid what to expect from it.”45 
Harris wanted the raid to be a big one because, as the boffins 
had previously concluded, this was the only way to saturate the 
defences. Yet he remained concerned because there was no prior 
experience with concentrations of ten or more aircraft per minute. 
After receiving ORS advice about the minimal chance of collision, 
he concluded that: “It was obviously much better to accept such 
a risk, which would mean that two or three aircraft were lost in a 
really heavy attack, if by doing so we could prevent the loss of 40 or 
50 aircraft from night fighters and flak.”46 In a letter to AOC-in-C 
Coastal Command he wrote: “the risk of collision is, in my opinion, 
more than counterbalanced by the complete confusion which will be 
caused to the enemy’s locator system and gunnery.”47 As predicted by 
the boffins, there was only one mid-air collision.
And so it went for three more years, with the scientists providing 
invaluable findings and recommendations for Harris and his staff to 
consider and act upon.
other readings
Several primary and secondary sources make direct or indirect 
reference to the efforts of the ORS and connect it to other aspects of 
the war including the development of technologies.
Three official studies should be noted. Previously mentioned, 
the RAF official history, The Strategic Air Offensive, is frank 
in its assessment of Bomber Command’s performance. It not only 
describes what went wrong, but also provides explanations, often 
citing ORS reports, although not by specific report number. Many 
of the charts depicting specific raids are taken from ORS documents. 
While not mentioned frequently, the existence and role of the ORS 
is acknowledged by the official historians. Volume 3 of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force official history, The Crucible of War, 1939-
1945, details the participation of the thousands of Canadians who, 
like other Commonwealth personnel, flew with the RAF during the 
45  Barker, The Thousand Plan, 44-48.
46  Harris, Bomber Offensive, 85.
47  Harris to Joubert de la Ferté, letter, 23 June 1942, Air 14/276, TNA. 
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war.48 In Canada’s case, an entire Bomber Command group, No. 6 
(RCAF) Group, was formed at the beginning of 1943. Published 
thirty-three years later, the Canadian history also makes use of 
ORS documents and charts and acknowledges the scientists. One 
additional official history mentioned earlier is of note. The Origins 
and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force 
deals with the impact of operational research across the RAF. The 
preface states that:
This monograph attempts to trace the origins and development of 
operational research in the Royal Air Force immediately before and 
during the last war and to illustrate the characteristic work performed 
by each of the operational research sections attached to Commands at 
home and overseas.49
One of Dickins’s scientists has also written on the functioning of 
the organisation and his perspective is unique. In Disturbing the 
Universe, Freeman Dyson explains some of what he saw, did and 
thought as a junior scientist in the section.50 It is clear from his 
commentary that he was unhappy with the area bombing policy, 
with Harris for prosecuting it and with the ORS for not countering 
the strategy based on research. A similarly critical appraisal of the 
Command comes from another operational research scientist, Solly 
Zuckerman, who worked extensively on bombing issues but was 
never a member of the BC ORS.51
Other useful works focus on the tactical aspects and events of the 
campaign. For example, Ralph Barker’s The Thousand Plan: The 
Story of the First Thousand Bomber Raid on Cologne examines 
the planning and execution of the first thousand-bomber raid and 
uses oral histories from Dickins, Harris and Saundby.52 One recent 
monograph describes the link between operational research, bombing 
effectiveness and strategic debates. In The Bomber War: The Allied 
48  Brereton Greenhous et al., The Crucible of War, 1939-1945: The Official History 
of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
49  Air Ministry, Operational Research in the RAF, xi.
50  Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).
51  Sir Solly Zuckerman. From Apes to Warlords: The Autobiography (1904-1946) of 
Solly Zuckerman (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978).
52  Ralph Barker, The Thousand Plan: The Story of the First Thousand Bomber Raid 
on Cologne (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965).  
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Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany, Robin Neillands attempts to 
determine why Harris and the Command are so widely criticised.53 
He compares Bomber Command with the US 8th Air Force, since the 
latter claimed to be able to conduct precision bombing. Neillands 
wants to see not just what was done by Harris, “but why it was done 
and whether, as so often alleged by Harris’s detractors, there was any 
other way of doing it at the time” [emphasis in original].54 Without 
looking at the operational researchers explicitly, he in fact focuses on 
the very heart of the challenge facing the senior leaders.
An earlier work, The Six-Year Offensive: Bomber Command in 
World War II, by Ken Delve and Peter Jacobs briefly discusses the 
role played by the scientists.55 Describing the establishment of the OR 
section the authors make a number of points, saying that the creation 
of an organisation which could look at problems with a scientific 
objectivity and then report on them candidly was long past due.56 At 
the same time, the authors indicate that few outside the Command 
headquarters knew of the section’s existence or influence and that the 
work of the scientists “has often been ignored by historians.”57 
A number of works deal with technologies and their use by 
Bomber Command. In Echoes of War: The Story of H2S Radar, 
Sir Bernard Lovell tells the story of this airborne radar and its 
derivatives.58 Michael Cumming’s Beam Bombers: The Secret War 
of No. 109 Squadron provides a parallel account of the radio beam 
navigation system that was codenamed Oboe.59 Gordon Musgrave’s 
Pathfinder Force: A History of 8 Group describes the employment 
53  Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi 
Germany (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001). Several works have examined the 
strategic and moral questions which continue to be asked, but do not make reference 
to operational research. See, for example, Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New 
York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979); Denis Richards, The Hardest Victory: 
RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War (London: W.W. Norton, 1995); 
and Mark Connelly, Reaching for the Stars (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).
54  Neillands, The Bomber War, 4. 
55  Ken Delve and Peter Jacobs, The Six-Year Offensive: Bomber Command in World 
War II (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992).
56  Delve and Jacobs, The Six-Year Offensive, 80.
57  Delve and Jacobs, The Six-Year Offensive, 129.
58  Sir Bernard Lovell, Echoes of War: The Story of H2S Radar (Bristol: Adam 
Hilger, 1991).
59  Michael Cumming, Beam Bombers: The Secret War of No. 109 Squadron (Thrupp, 
Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998).
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of these systems so that the reader can get a three-dimensional feel 
for what took place and was seen by flyers in the night sky.60  
Similar to these studies of technologies and techniques are those 
works that examine the application of operational research to resolve 
difficulties encountered in the field. In 1947 J.G. Crowther and R. 
Whiddington published Science at War, a small volume designed 
to tell the story of how scientists contributed to the conduct of the 
war.61 Similarly, Ronald Clark’s 1962 The Rise of the Boffins was the 
product of a desire to describe “the scientists’ war.”62 Two more recent 
writings provide examinations of operational research in support of 
the British war effort. Joseph F. McCloskey’s “British Operational 
Research in World War II” is brief, but still detailed enough to make 
clear the main constituents of operational research in all three British 
services.63 More comprehensive, but less focussed, is Maurice Kirby’s 
Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience 
from the 1930s to 1970.64
some concluding thoughts – did operational research 
influence decisions and so what?
The existing discourse on Sir Arthur Harris and Bomber Command 
tells us much about the bombing campaign. But what we do not 
yet adequately understand is how Harris came to make his tactical 
and technical decisions, the decisions that affected the day-to-day 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations and that ultimately made 
his operational goals attainable. 
60  Gordon Musgrave, Pathfinder Force: A History of 8 Group (London: Macdonald 
and Jane’s Publishers Ltd, 1976).
61  J.G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1947).
62  Ronald W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (London: Phoenix House, 1962), xvii. 
See also Ronald W Clark, Tizard (London: Methuen and Co, 1965).  
63  Joseph F. McCloskey, “British Operational Research in World War II,” Operations 
Research 35, 3 (May-June 1987): 453-69. Two other post-war monographs on 
operational research make mention of wartime activities:  Patrick Rivett, Concepts 
of Operational Research (London: C.A. Watts & Co. Ltd, 1968); and P.G. Moore, 
Basic Operational Research (London: Sir Isaac Pittman & Sons Co, 1968).
64  Maurice W. Kirby, Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience 
from the 1930s to 1970 (London: Imperial College Press, 2003).  
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From the ORS manuscript we can see clearly that while Harris 
was undoubtedly the decision maker, at the same time he had access 
to and accepted the advice of his operational research staff. Indeed, 
Harris was certainly effusive about his boffins: “An Operational 
Research Section is indispensable…[and] the work of the large research 
section of my Command saved thousands of lives and hundreds of 
aircraft.”65 He might have added that it rendered the work of the 
Command more effective and efficient at the same time. 
So what? Reading this manuscript gives a sense of the complex, 
ambiguous and often chaotic circumstances of the bomber war and 
the challenges that Harris and other commanders faced. That they 
were aided in quantifying and qualifying these difficulties and 
in developing solutions that could be practically applied speaks 
much to the value of science and the hard work and dedication of 
Harris’s scientists.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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